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Edward P.  Lazear 
Concern  over  the  poor  savings performance  of  the  United  States has been 
growing. Many pointed out the “problem” early, and Feldstein made it a major 
theme of  his time on the Reagan Council of Economic Advisors. Some have 
tried to explain the differences between savings rates in Japan and the United 
States, attributing the differences sometimes to measurement  and sometimes 
to real factors. 
This essay asks more fundamentally whether differences or inadequacies in 
savings behavior affect welfare, and if  so, how. Essentially, it is an attempt to 
reconcile taste differences and to ask whether the differences have implications 
for government-sponsored  saving. Further, it asks whether differences in sav- 
ings behavior across countries or over time have any implications for welfare. 
The discussion  is divided  into three parts. The paper begins  with a brief 
review of  the issues, focusing on low US.  savings rates, the behavior of  the 
rates over time, and the rates in comparison to those of other countries, primar- 
ily Japan. Second, implications of low-saving behavior for social welfare are 
examined. This section forms the heart of the paper because it discusses by 
which criterion savings rates are too low. Third, some conceptually different 
measurement issues are discussed. The key points are: 
1. There is no apparent way  to reconcile differences between the U.S. and 
Japanese savings rates without an appeal to tastes differences. Even within the 
United States, it is difficult to explain savings behavior over time in the frame- 
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work of a population with a homogeneous utility function. Particularly, differ- 
ences in demographics  cannot go far enough to explain the dramatic fall in 
savings rates during the 1980s. 
2. In a world without tax distortions and other externalities, any attempt to 
increase American savings rates would raise income for most of the individuals 
in society, but would lower social welfare. 
3. The most obvious type of  intergenerational  externality, which takes the 
form of  underinvestment in human capital, does nothing to reconcile  differ- 
ences in savings rates. Reducing the externality in the United States would, if 
anything, increase the divergence between American and Japanese measured 
savings rates. 
4. When we argue that there is too little saving, it is important to specify 
how we establish the optimal  level of  saving from which the observed level 
deviates. Depending on the social welfare function, over- or undersavings can 
result. If  the social planner cares only about efficiency, then private  savings 
decisions are optimal even if they result in low savings rates. If the social plan- 
ner has a utilitarian function, then saving is too high or too low depending on 
the amount that parents love their children relative to the amount that children 
love their parents. If love is symmetric, then private savings rates are optimal. 
When love goes primarily  one way  (from parent to the child), undersavings, 
possibly by a very large amount, by both generations results. 
5. The ability of the older generation to free ride on their children results in 
less saving by both generations. The extent of the undersavings depends on the 
amount that children care for their parents and on the social welfare function. 
6. If the worry over low savings is that one’s child suffers for one’s current 
consumption, the concern can be alleviated individually. Any one person can 
save and pass income to his child directly, without the acquiescence of  fellow 
citizens. Collective action is necessary only when one American cares about 
another American’s child but not about foreign children. 
7. On-the-job saving is likely to make it more rather than less difficult to 
explain differences in saving between the United States and Japan. If anything, 
taking on-the-job  saving and investment into account  would  make Japanese 
rates even higher relative to American ones. 
The conclusion  is  that  there  may  well  be  too  little saving in  the  United 
States. Whether there is or not depends on the preferences  of  individuals in 
society and on the social welfare function. Indeed, some increases in saving 
may even be Pareto improving under  specific assumptions  about  individual 
utility functions. Unfortunately, none of the evidence on cross-country compar- 
isons nor on time-series changes in savings rates in the United States bears on 
the undersaving issue. The fact that the United  States saves less than Japan 
indicates  neither that  we  save too little nor that  they  save too much. Other 
evidence about preferences is necessary to determine whether our savings rates 
are too low. 145  Some Thoughts on Savings 
5.1  Macroeconomic  Issues 
The thrust of  the literature over the past few years is that the American sav- 
ings rate is too low, particularly when compared to other countries (see Sum- 
mers  1986: Summers and Carroll  1987: Munnell  and  Cook  1991; Kopcke, 
Munnell, and Cook  1991; Auerbach and Kotlikoff  1983: Christian0 1989). A 
number of  researchers have tried to rationalize that fact, whereas others have 
tried to show that it is not a fact, i.e., that the data give a misleading picture, 
especially for international comparisons. 
5.1.1  The Standard Model 
Before considering  these claims, let us specify the problem  more clearly. 
The usual way to think about saving is in an overlapping generation context. 
Each individual lives two or three periods, and the first generation is old when 
the next  generation  is young  or middle-aged.  The model  here uses a three- 
period  lifetime. Think of the individual as living to age 90; period  1 corre- 
sponds to ages younger than 30, period 2 to ages 30-60,  and period 3 to ages 
above 60. The individual is assumed to work in periods  1 and 2 and to retire 
during period 3. Retirement can be defined as that period when marginal pro- 
ductivity at work falls short of the value of leisure, so that retirement is endoge- 
nous rather than given. 
No explicit bequest motive is incorporated into the analysis. Of course, one 
can think of  the utility  from consumption in period  3 as being partially the 
result of  own consumption and partially the result of utility from bequests. 
An individual of generation i has wages during period t of w,.  Individuals 
of generation  i live during periods  i,  i + 1, and i + 2, so the first generation 
lives in periods 1,2, and 3, whereas the second generation lives during periods 
2, 3, and 4, and so forth. Consumption by i in t is denoted as C,,, and savings 
are similarly denoted S!,. 
First, consider only the first generation’s consumption program. Individuals 
of  this generation  earn wages during periods  1 and 2 but have no wages in 
period 3. Their problem is to save so as to maximize utility according to 
(1)  Max U(W, -  S,) + 6U(W2  + S,(1 + p) -  S,) + 6?U(S2(1  + p)), 
SI 52 
assuming time-separable utility. The first-generation subscnpt is suppressed, 6 
is the discount factor, and  p is the rate of return on capital.’ The first-order 
conditions are 
(2a)  -U‘(W, -  S,) + 6U’(W2  + S,(1 + p) -  SJ(1  + p) = 0, 
(2b)  -Ur(W2 + S,(1 + p) + 6U’(S2(l + p))(l + p) = 0. 
I. Under the standard assumptions, in equilibrium, the marginal rate of return to capital equals 
(I -  6)/6. 146  Edward P. Lazear 
Comparative statics are generally ambiguous. They can more easily be illus- 
trated by assuming log utility, as is common. Under these circumstances, equa- 
tion (2) becomes 
= 0,  -1  S(1 + PI  + ...  . 
w, - s,  w2 + S,(1 + p) - s2 
-1  6 
~  - +--0. 
w,  + S,(I + p) - s,  s, 
(3b) 
A number of points can be illustrated using this basic model. First, rewrite 
equation (3a) as 
(4) 
It is very likely that  W2 exceeds  W,, since the former is defined as earnings 
between ages 30 and 60 and the latter as earnings between ages 0 and 30. If 
so, then S, >  S,,  because the usual equilibrium condition is that (1 + p) = 1/6. 
This is the intuitive and empirically valid result that individuals save more 
when middle-aged than they do when they are young. Even without invoking 
the impetuousness of  youth, it is natural to do more saving as a middle-aged 
individual because income is higher during the middle years. 
The evidence from the United States is consistent with this basic result. Both 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff  (1990) and Attanasio  (1993) use the Consumer Ex- 
penditure  Survey to estimate  saving over the life cycle. Both  sets of authors 
find that savings rates are relatively low before age 30, then peak and decline 
during the final years of life. Auerbach and Kotlikoff find that that consump- 
tion is less than earnings approximately between ages 20 and 60, but that con- 
sumption exceeds earnings at both ends of the life cycle. 
Some of the results are consistent with observed international phenomena 
and some are not. Of particular interest is the comparison between the United 
States and Japan. Table 5.1 and figure 5.1 (a histogram) present information on 
the age distribution of the population in Japan and the United States in 1970. 
Table 5.2 presents a time series of savings rates. 
The tables reveal  not only that American  rates are low but that Japanese 
rates are very high. When put in the context of  the world economy, the US. 
rates do not appear to be low, except during the period of the 1980s. In some 
sense, the question is, Why are Japanese rates so high? not, Why are American 
rates so low? Still, the 1980s present a real discrepancy and one that has persis- 
tence without obvious explanation. 
There is no particular trend in the difference between Japanese and Ameri- 
can savings rates over the 1960-89  period. There has been some convergence 
since 1970, primarily because the Japanese savings rate, which was around 25 
percent in 1970, has declined to more modest levels. But the fall in the Ameri- 
can savings rate that occurred during the 1980s is reversing the convergence. 
Demographics cannot explain all differences. The peak difference between 
s, = w,  -  W,6(1 + p) + S,(l + p)(l + 6). 147  Some Thoughts on Savings 
Table 5.1  Population Composition in Japan and the United States, 1970 
Highest Age in  United 
























8.7  16.8 
8.  I  19.8 
7.8  20.5 
9  18.8 
10.6  16.1 
9  13.2 
8.3  11.2 
8.2  10.9 
7.3  11.8 
5.8  11.9 
4.8  10.9 
4.4  9.8 
3.7  8.4 
2.9  6.8 
2.1  5.2 
I .2  3.6 
0.6  2.1 
0.2  I .5 
Proportion (7~) 
37.7799  33.3668 
47.9065  37.6819 
5 1.5093  45.5093 
28. I402  29.9047 
Sources: United Nations (1971, 1981); U.S. Bureau of  the Census (1970, 1980). 
dRelevant  for 1980. 
bRelevant for 1990. 
'Relevant  for 1960. 
U.S. and Japanese savings rates was in 1970, when the difference was 19 per- 
cent. But the proportions of individuals 30-59  years old were more equal in 
1970 than in 1980 (see table 5.1), even though savings rates were more equal 
in 1980. Indeed, middle-age population proportions were most equal in 1960, 
even though savings rate differences were about as large in 1960 as they were 
in  1980. While different ages can be defined as the high-saving years, it ap- 
pears that a simple demographic explanation, based on the number of individu- 
als in the high-saving cohort, does not explain the data. Japan always has a 
much higher savings rate than the United States, and the differences do not 
conform to differences in the age distribution of the population. 
Perhaps  a more  sophisticated  approach  will reconcile  some of  the differ- 
ences. One approach is to ask, How much higher would the US. savings rate 
be if the United States had the same age distribution as Japan? To  do that, I 
have used the age distribution from table 5.1 and combined it with the earnings 148  Edward P.  Lazear 
Table 5.2  Savings Rates, 1960-89 
Japan -  Europe - 
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Source: Nurionul Accounts, 1960-89,  Main Aggregates, vol.  1  (Paris: OECD, I99 I). 
Nore: Savings is defined at net savings divided by GDP. 
and consumption results from Auerbach and Kotlikoff  (1990). I use the base 
year of  1980, when the difference in savings rates between the United States 
and Japan was 12 percent. The approach is to calculate weighted earnings and 
weighted consumption, where the weights are the population proportions. An 
“actual” number for the United States and a predicted number based on Japa- 
nese demographics are reported. They are calculated as 149  Some Thoughts on Savings 
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Highest Age in Category 
Fig. 5.1 
Note: Horizontal axis reports highest age in five-year cell, except that “85” refers to individuals 
85 or more years old. 
Age distribution of population in Japan and the United States, 1970 
where -yys is the proportion of the population age group j  in the United States 
in  1980,  is earnings, and qS  is consumption of group j  in  1980. Corre- 
spondingly, 
w  c  Y:apan (ys  -  qs) 
(6)  Predicted savings rate on earnings =  I=’  ~ 
wys  c Yy 
,=I 
The results is that the U.S. savings rate would have been 8.4 percent higher 
in 1980 if the United States had Japan’s demographics.2 This goes much of  the 
way  toward explaining differences across countries. The rest, it might be ar- 
gued, results from measurement  error. But demographics  and measurement 
error cannot explain everything. Specifically, the rapid fall off in U.S. savings 
in the  1980s and the widening gap between  American  and Japanese savings 
cannot be attributed to demographics, which change slowly. 
The time-series  puzzle has been observed for the United States by others. 
As a number of authors have pointed out, it is impossible to explain the U.S. 
time  series of  savings rates  simply by resorting  to demographics  (see, e.g., 
Attanasio  1993; Auerbach  and Kotlikoff  1990; Summers and Carroll  1987). 
2. This savings rate is not the same as the one reported in official accounts. The rate calculated 
is personal savings and does not correct for differences in business savings. 150  Edward P.  Lazear 
Attanasio invokes cohort effects to explain the decline in savings rates during 
the  1980s. He argues that the cohorts born between  1925 and  1939 were re- 
sponsible for the decline in U.S. savings in the 1980s, because they are a low- 
saving cohort. During the  1980s, they were in the part of the life cycle when 
saving is highest. Cohort effects are, in this context, synonymous  with taste 
differences, so resorting to cohort effects is an admission that we have no ex- 
planation. 
The 1980s were a period when real income declined for a large portion of 
the population (see, e.g., Murphy and Welch  1991; Katz and Murphy 1991). 
One additional possibility is that the decline  in real income affected saving, 
either because it was seen as a transitory shock, in which case savings would 
fall, or because it had an adverse impact on that part of  the population which 
should be saving. 
A decline  in the  wages  of  middle-aged  workers depresses  the  savings of 
middle-aged workers but increases the savings of young workers. Differentiat- 
ing along the first-order conditions in equation (3),  one obtains 
i7a) 
dSl  =  >o. 
iw;  I.J:  1 + 116 
A fall in the wages of the middle-aged would increase savings of the young, 
who are not big  savers, and decrease savings of the middle-aged  group that 
does the most saving. Further, decreased income among the young would de- 
press their savings as well. 
Still, this can at best explain the decline in savings rates in the  1970s and 
1980s. It cannot reconcile differences across countries, nor is it consistent with 
low rates of saving during the 1960s. 
In some sense, the life-cycle model, or some variant of it, is the only real 
model to explain savings behavior. Unfortunately, the model in its purest form, 
where tastes are assumed to be stable across countries and over time, does not 
explain enough. Invoking  cohort effects, as Attanasio  does, is analogous to 
using taste differences across countries to explain differences in saving behav- 
ior. Differences  in the utility function (rather than prices or income) are the 
most natural candidate to explain differences in savings by cohort. But this is 
little better than saying that the Japanese save more than Americans because 
the Japanese have longer horizons and Americans live for today. 
5.1.2  Interest Rate Sensitivity 
One possibility is that interest rate differences over time or across countries 
explain savings behavior. At least the time-series behavior of savings and inter- 151  Some Thoughts on Savings 
est rates can be easily examined. It is quite apparent that interest rates do not 
explain the U.S. time series of savings behavior. 
Regressions of  US. savings rates from table 5.2 on interest rates are pre- 
sented in table 5.3. Three definitions of interest rates are used. In the first re- 
gression, nominal six-month T-bill rates are the independent variables. In the 
second and third regressions, real  rates, either ex ante or ex post, are used. 
OLS regressions of savings on these rates do not support the view that savings 
responds positively to interest rates. Of course, there is a question of simultane- 
ity here. Under the assumption that capital markets are global, American savers 
can be assumed to be price takers. If so, the elasticity of savings with respect 
to interest rates  should be positive.  But  if  individual countries  face a given 
interest rate, then interest rates cannot possibly reconcile differences between 
U.S. and Japanese  saving behavior. Both would face the same rates, and the 
United States saves at lower rates. Only if Japan were in one market and the 
United States in another could differences in interest rates reconcile interna- 
tional saving behavior. 
A regression is not needed to point out the obvious. Table 5.4 presents data 
on interest rates  and savings for the United States during the past 30 years. 
During the late  196Os, savings rates fell as interest rates rose. The relatively 
high savings period during the late 1970s had, on average, low interest rates. 
There is no clear pattern that emerges from looking at the data. 
Table 5.3  Regression of U.S. Savings Rates on Six-Month T-Bill Rates: 
Dependent Variable is U.S. Savings Rate 
Variable  DF  Parameter Estimate  Standard Error  T-Ratio  Prob > JTI 
1: Independent Variable Is the Nominal Rate 
INTERCEP  1  0.156995  0.03075496  5.105  0.000  I 
tbill  1  -2.000409  0.83798562  -2.387  0.0249 
tbill X tbill  I  9.063007  5.10747294  1.774  0.0882 
n = 28,  R2  = .34 
2: Independent Variable Is the Ex Ante Real Ratea 
INTERCEP  1  0.085371  0.00657687  12.981  0.0001 
Real  1  -0.199755  0.22  157425  -0.902  0.3759 
RealXReal  1  -  10,476829  2.68034044  -3.909  0.0006 
n = 28,  R2 = .39 
3: Independent Variable Is the Ex Post Real Rateb 
INTERCEP  1  0.081496  0.00562217  14.496  0.0001 
“Real”  1  -0.404860  0.18993 127  -2.132  0.0430 
“Rea1”X“Real”  1  -3.41 8567  3.34519428  -  1.022  0.3 166 
n = 28,  R’=  .33 
Calculated as the nominal rate minus the predicted  rate of  inflation, using a three-year moving 
average of CPI-based inflation figures. 
bCalculated as the nominal rate minus actual inflation during the subsequent year, based on CPI 
figures. 152  Edward P. Lazear 
Table 5.4  Savings and Interest Rates in the United States 
~~  ~~  ~  ~ 
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Either the assumption of exogeneity does not hold or the savings elasticity 
is negative,  which  seems difficult  to  accept.  The naive  analysis  contradicts 
some earlier claims (see, e.g., Summers 1984), but is backed up by more recent 
sophisticated studies. Since the positive relation of saving to interest rates can- 
not be observed  in  simple correlations,  it  is necessary  to argue that  simple 
OLS is inappropriate. Standard simultaneity arguments provide one reason for 
doubt. One of  the more compelling studies is Hall (1988). By estimating elas- 
ticities of  intertemporal  substitution, Hall finds that the interest elasticity of 
savings is very low, which implies that exogenous  shifts in  interest rates do 
little to explain the time series of saving behavior. The conclusion, applied to 
the cross section, is that neither interest rates nor demographics can by them- 
selves explain differences between U.S. and Japanese saving behavior. 153  Some Thoughts on Savings 
5.2  International Differences in Tastes 
Apparently, savings rates in the 1980s are much lower in the United States 
than in other developed countries, particularly Japan. If demographic and inter- 
est rate differences do not account for this savings rate differential, then per- 
haps  other measurement  considerations  do. These are discussed  below, but 
suppose, as is likely, that the differences are real and not mere measurement. 
The obvious question to ask is, Why should we care? 
The differences in savings rates that cannot be rationalized most likely re- 
flect differences in tastes across countries rather than differences in income or 
prices. But economists rarely pass judgement on taste differences. Few would 
be willing to criticize  an  individual because  he prefers chocolate  to  vanilla 
ice cream. What is different about time preference that makes economists so 
uncomfortable?  The purpose  of  this  section is to discuss  systematically the 
arguments for and against saving stimulation. 
First, let us return to the model in equation (1). Differentiating the first-order 
conditions with respect to 6 yields 
An increase in 6 increases saving among both the young and middle-aged. One 
way to rationalize the differences between the Japanese and American saving 
rates is to argue that 6 is higher in Japan than in the United States. 
If  this were true, then for a given wage structure, the typical middle-aged 
or elderly Japanese would  be richer than the typical middle-aged  or elderly 
American.  But  younger  Americans  would  have  higher  consumption  than 
younger Japanese. It also follows immediately  from optimization  that, if  an 
American  were  somehow  induced  (say through  a tax  or subsidy  policy) to 
adopt the Japanese savings schedule, he would have lower lifetime utility, even 
though his consumption  throughout  most of his lifetime would be higher. If 
differences in time preference account for the results of the cross-country com- 
parison, they do not imply that America's situation would be improved by clos- 
ing the gap. 
5.2.1  Intergenerational Externalities in Investment 
In order to justify a concern over low savings rates, the basic model must be 
embellished to take other effects into account. The most obvious candidate is 
that future generations suffer as a result of the current generation's actions in a 
way that is not internalized by the current generations3  One direct way in which 
3. There is now a long literature on intergenerational considerations. Some early papers are by 
Becker (1974), Barro (1974), Bemheim and Bagwell (1988), and Bemheim, Shleifer and Sum- 
mers (1985). 154  Edward P. Lazear 
this can work is within the family. Suppose that there are actions that a father 
can  take on  behalf  of  his child  which  yield  higher than  the market  rate of 
return. 
For example, in an early study, I estimated that there was a high payoff to 
being born in the urban north over the rural south (see Lazear 1983). The pay- 
off was sufficiently high that a child could pay his parent to move to the urban 
north and apparently make both parties better off. But two conditions are nec- 
essary. First, the unmeasured costs borne by the parent must not be so large as 
to swamp the benefits. Second, the parent must be able to extract payment from 
the child either  directly or through  altruistic  utility  considerations.  A move 
would imply deferred consumption by the parent now, in return for higher con- 
sumption (observed or true) later. 
In the same paper, I found that black children benefit when they come from 
an educated househo1d.j It is impossible to say whether black parents internal- 
ize these effects or not, but the potential exists for large gains from additional 
saving and  investment  in  parental  human  capital  among this disadvantaged 
group. 
While these examples are interesting, they do not address the issue of differ- 
ences in observed savings rates across countries. Even if we were to argue that 
these effects were large, they would not imply that the measured savings rate 
would rise. Additional schooling by the first generation shows up not only as 
low consumption, but also as low income. If  anything, the measured savings 
rate would probably fall if more internally financed human capital investment 
were undertaken,  since people may  borrow  when  in  school. Similarly, geo- 
graphic relocation would probably imply a reduction in current earnings and 
an  increase  in  the  observed  consumptiodearnings ratio  among those  who 
move. Nor do these externalities speak to the decline in the U.S. saving rate 
during the  1980s. What kind of  intergenerational  externality would result in 
too little physical savings as we currently measure it? 
5.2.2 
Bequests and inter vivos transfers from parents to children, during middle 
and old age, have been ignored. But even if they are taken  into account, the 
argument for increased saving is not an obvious one. Suppose, for example, 
that  consumption  by  generation  1 during period  3 were really  a bequest  to 
generation 2, at that point middle-aged. The choice of S2 determines the size 
of the bequest, and if S2  were higher, the bequest would be higher. But inducing 
a higher bequest is not obviously social welfare increasing. 
In  fact, there is nothing  necessarily  intertemporal  about the argument.  A 
transfer from one individual in generation  1 to another individual in generation 
1 could provide both with utility, if  the donor has the recipient in his utility 
Individual Utility and Social Welfare Functions 
4. More recently. Borjas (1992)  has documented a similar, but more general phenomenon across 
a large number of ethnic groups. 155  Some Thoughts on Savings 
function.  But it does not follow that the amount of  transfer undertaken  pri- 
vately is necessarily socially inefficient. 
To determine whether intergenerational considerations imply too little sav- 
ing, let us return to the model in equation (1). Recall that C,, is consumption 
of generation  i in period t (and similarly for other variables). Let us simplify 
the problem by shortening each person’s life to two periods. 
First, it is necessary to specify a social welfare function. There are two obvi- 
ous candidates:  efficient and  utilitarian.  Attention  is restricted  to these two 
welfare functions not only because they are the most commonly used, but also 
because  a sufficiently perverted  social planner  might  well  have preferences 
over intergenerational consumption that deviate from any privately optimal al- 
location. 
If  the social welfare function maximizes efficiency, then the private saving 
rule must be optimal. The parent maximizes 
(9)  Max WW,,  -  Sll)  + S[WW12  + Sll(l  + P) -  TI2)  t 
AWW,,  + TI, -  S2J1  + S2AU(W,, + SJl  + p)), 
where TI, is the transfer in period  2 from generation  1 to generation  2 and 
where the parent takes into account the child’s saving behavior. The parent’s 
altruism  is measured  by  A, which is the weight  of  the child’s utility  in the 
parent’s utility function. 
~12.SI2 
The child in turn maximizes 
(10)  Max  U(WI2  + TI, -  S,,)  + SWW,,  +  + PI), 
s22 
given the transfer TI?  from his parent. 
All choices of TI, are on the utility frontier and are efficient. Since saving 
choice is privately optimal, efficiency is always served. There are no externali- 
ties; there is no amount that the child could pay the parent to save more. The 
child can borrow or lend at the market rate, and there is no necessity to obtain 
the funds from or lend directly to his parent. Further, as long as TI, is positive, 
additional  saving  does not affect the child’s income. If  the criterion is effi- 
ciency, there  is  no  deviation  of  the  private  savings path  from the  welfare- 
maximizing path. 
The utilitarian criterion allows for the possibility of undersavings. One rea- 
sonable social welfare function is 
Welfare = (Discounted utility of generation  1) 
+ y (Discounted utility of generation 2), 
(11) Welfare = U(W,, -  S,,) + 6[U(W12  + Sll(l  + p) -  TI,) + 
(A + y)W1*  + W,, -  S,Jl  + 82(x + y)U(W,,  +  + p)), 
where y is the weighting that the social planner places on generation 2 relative 
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The social planner counts the utility of the second generation X + y times. 
Generation 2’s utility enters the social welfare function directly, with a scalar 
of y, but also indirectly since it boosts the welfare of the altruistic parent. 
The social planner’s first-order conditions are 
By contrast, the private maximization problem proceeds in two stages. The 
parent can choose the transfer that he makes to the child during period 2, and 
he takes into account that the transfer affects the child’s saving behavior as the 
child maximizes equation (10). For any given transfer of TI,, the child chooses 
S22  to maximize equation (10). The child’s first-order condition is 
SU’(W2, + S22(1  + P))(l  + P) = 0. 
The parent’s problem is then to choose S,,  and TI,  so as to maximize equa- 
tion (9),  taking into account that the child behaves in accordance with equation 
(13). The parent’s first-order conditions are 
Savings and transfers  are determined  by  the  solutions  to  equations (1 3), 
(14a), and (14b). The social planner would like the choices to solve equations 
(12a)-( 12c), instead. The difference between the two systems is that equation 
(12b) differs from equation (14b). The parent takes into account the effect of 
his transfer on his offspring in a different way  than does the social planner. 
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whereas the social planner counts it y  + A. For reasonable  parameters, this 
generally leads to too small a private transfer from the parent to child, which 
in turn leads to undersavings by both the parent and child. 
Since the parent does not transfer  as much  as is  socially desirable,  he is 
richer in period 2 than he otherwise would be. As a result, he saves less. Put 
alternatively, he saves less because he must finance a smaller transfer to his 
child in period  2. Also, since the child’s income in period  2 is lower than it 
would be under the social optimum, he has less income to smooth into genera- 
tion 2. So savings by generation 2 are lower in period 2 as well. 
To  get a sense of  the importance of  the effect, consider a frequently used 
utility function, U = ln(C,) + 6 ln(C,+,).  Further, suppose that the parent cares 
for his child as much as he does for himself, so that  A  = 1. Finally, suppose 
that the social planner treats all generations the same (except for discounting), 
so that y = 1. Initially, let income be constant over time, so that all wages in 
the economy are  1 and let 6 = .95. Table 5.5 gives the solution to the social 
planner’s problem in equation (12) and to the private optimization in equations 
(13) and (14). Panel A reveals that savings are eight to nine times higher when 
society’s objective function  is maximized  than when  private  optimization  is 
done. These large differences obtain even when parents are genuinely altruis- 
tic, treating children’s utility as as valuable as their own. 
Key here is the double counting of children’s utility by  the  social planner. 
The social planner prefers larger transfers because a transfer to the child contri- 
butes  not only to  the child’s utility, but also to  the parent’s utility. Taking a 
dollar from the parent and transfemng it to the child has no effect on the par- 
ent’s utility at the private optimum, but increases social welfare by the marginal 
value of a dollar. 
Assumptions can be changed to alter the size of these effects. One alteration 
is to build technological change that shows up through wage growth into the 
model. Suppose that wages in period  1 are 1, but that they grow by 10 percent 
each period. Panel B of table 5.5 contains the results of the simulation. Now 
private savings and transfers are actually negative. Since children are going to 
be richer than their parents, parents would like to take money away from their 
Table 5.5  Optimal Savings and Transfers 
Variable  Social Optimum  Private Optimum 
A: All Wages = I 
s,,  ,3555  .0415 
s22  ,3705  ,0424 
TI  2  .7 175  ,0441 
SI  I  ,2926  -.0519 
S?Z  ,3044  -.0557 
T,  2  ,6827  -.0564 
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kids and do so by  extracting income from generation  2 when parents are old 
and children are young. As a result, parents are richer in period 2 and conse- 
quently borrow in period  1. But the same is true for generation 2. Since chil- 
dren are poor  in  period  2  relative to period  3, not  only because  wages  are 
growing, but  also because parents extract transfers from them, they wish  to 
borrow as well. While the socially optimal level of  transfers and saving falls, 
the extent of the reductions are smaller and none of the variables becomes neg- 
ative. 
The conclusion  is that there is potential for undersavings when the social 
welfare function takes into account intergenerational utility in what might be 
termed an egalitarian way.  These effects can be quite large. This conclusion 
depends crucially on an asymmetry. The parent cares about the child, but the 
child does not care about his parent. If altruism goes in both directions to the 
same extent, the deviation between private and social savings rates disappears. 
The child cannot affect the transfers from parent to child because the parent 
can always fail to consume and simply bequeath the resid~al.~  Thus, the private 
solution remains unchanged. But now the social welfare function becomes 
(15) Max  (1 + e)u(w,,  -  Sll)  + W1 + 8)WW12  + S,,(1 + P) -  T12) 
TI1 s22 TI2 
+ (A + y)U(T,, + w,,  -  S22)I + 
&*(A + y)uW,, + S2A1 + P)), 
where  8 is the relative  weight that children  give to their parent’s utility. As 
before, let utility be logarithmic and suppose that 8 = 1, so that children love 
their parents as much as themselves. It can then be shown that the social optima 
that are the maximum of equation (15) are exactly the private optima given in 
table 5.5. 
The intuition before was that undersavings occurred because parents over- 
valued their own consumption, not taking into account that their child’s con- 
sumption produced  utility twice-once  directly for the child and once indi- 
rectly  for the  parent.  But  now,  parental  consumption  also produces  utility 
twice-once  directly for the parent  and once indirectly for the child. Thus, 
social savings are lower because savings and subsequent transfers to the chil- 
dren reduce the utility that the children would receive from seeing their par- 
ents happy. 
If  the argument for undersavings is that the parent’s utility-maximizing be- 
havior  differs from social-welfare-maximizing  behavior,  it  must  rely  on an 
asymmetry that has parents loving children more than children love their par- 
ents. While the asymmetry is hardly an unreasonable assumption, I doubt that 
it lies behind most fears that Americans undersave. Nor does it help reconcile 
the differences between US.  and Japanese savings rates. What kind of argu- 
ment would one need to make to claim that the difference between U.S. and 
5. This ignores tax and timing issues. 159  Some Thoughts on Savings 
Japanese savings behavior reflects suboptimal savings by Americans? Unrecip- 
rocated  love of  their children  by  Americans  could result  in  substantial  un- 
dersavings. But it is difficult to understand why the Japanese would save at the 
socially optimal rates, rather than the privately optimal ones. If Japanese chil- 
dren were more loving of their parents than American  children, the  socially 
optimal rate of  savings in Japan would fall to the privately optimal one in the 
United States, not the reverse. Then it would be necessary to explain why Japa- 
nese saving is too high, not why American savings are too low. 
Key here is the idea that saving can be too low only after some criterion has 
been specified. Selecting a social welfare function is equivalent to selecting an 
optimal saving path, but the choice of  the appropriate social welfare function 
is  far from obvious.  A strong case that Americans undersave  can be made, 
but neither the cross-country comparisons nor the time-series decline provides 
evidence for this kind of undersaving. 
5.2.3 
Now that altruism has been considered, it is straightforward to analyze an- 
other possible concern about undersavings, namely, free riding by the elderly. 
One possibility is that individuals will undersave when young, leaving them- 
selves destitute  when  old. As  long as the  young  generation  cares about the 
utility of the older generation, they will transfer resources toward parents. But 
these ex post transfers may differ from those that would be chosen if parents 
did not have the ability to force their children to care for them. 
Above, TI,  was positive, so there was no way for the child to force the parent 
to consume. But if TI, is negative, so that the net transfer goes from child to 
parent, then the child can affect T,,  directly through inter vivos transfers, which 
the child can be confident will be consumed by the parent. 
Suppose that parameters are such that the parent’s optimum implies a nega- 
tive level of transfer. The parent may be able to extract payments from his child 
while  the  child  is under  his  direct  supervision.  The more  interesting  case, 
which captures the spirit of free riding, is that the child cares about his parent. 
Knowing this, the parent overconsumes when young, inducing his offspring to 
support him through  direct inter vivos transfers  when he is old.h While this 
may result in low saving levels by the parent, the issue is whether the savings 
level is low relative to some benchmark. One benchmark is the social welfare 
function. As already shown, savings may be higher or lower than optimal, de- 
pending on the social welfare function. In this case, however, a more natural 
comparison is the consumption path that the child would choose if he could 
control his parent’s consumption before  his  own birth. The essence of  free 
riding is that the child’s love for his parent creates an opportunity for the parent 
to overconsume, relative to what the child would like. Let us consider this for- 
mally. 
Free Riding by the Elderly 
6.  The importance of inter vivos transfers has been examined empirically by Donald Cox (1  987). 160  Edward P.  Lazear 
The child is going to support his parent on net, so it is natural to determine 
the levels of consumption and savings that the child would choose were he able 
to control parental choice. Suppose that the child values his parent’s utility at 
8 relative to his own. Then if the child could choose all variables, his problem 
would be 
(16)  Max  8U(W,, -  Sll)  + 8SU(Wl, + Sll(l + p) + T2J 
,r,l.S,>Tzz 
+ SU(W,,  - s22  -  T22)  + SZU(W,, + SZ2(1  + PI), 
where T,,  = -TI,,  i.e., the transfer from child to parent. The first-order condi- 
tions are 
a 
as,  I 
a 
as,, 
(17a)  ~  = -U’(W,, -  Sll) + 6(1 + p)U’(W,, + Sll(l  + p) + T,,)  = 0, 
(17b)  ~~  = -U’(W2,  - s,, - T2,) + S(1 + p)U’(W,,  + Sz2(1  + p)) = 0, 
a 
dT2, 
(17~)  --  = 8U’(Wl, + S,,(I + p) + T,,)  -  U’(W,? -  S2, -  T2J = 0. 
If the parent can lead, however, by choosing sufficiently high consumption 
in period  1, then he will be destitute in period 2, inducing the child to make 
larger transfers. The child then takes S,,  as given and maximizes 
(18)  Max 8U(Wll -  Sll)  + SOU(W12 + Sl,(l  + p) + T2J + SU(W2? 
S2,.T22 
-  s,, -  T,,)  + S2WW,, + S22(1  + PI), 
with first-order conditions 
a 
as22 
(19a) --  = -  U’(  W,, -  S,,  -  T,,)  + S( 1 + p)U‘(W2, + S2,(  1 + p)) = 0, 
The problem for the parent (who does not care about his child) is 
(20)  Max  U(W,, -  Sll)  + 8U(Wl, + sll(l  + P) + 7‘,,), 
SI I 
with first-order condition 
= -U’(W,,  -  SIl)  +  a 
as,, 
(21) 
SU’(W,, + Sll(l  + p) + T,,)  1 + p + 5,  I  1, 
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where arz,  1  reflects the parent’s taking into account that his child’s transfer 
asll  (19h) 
responds to his (the parent’s) consumption. Note that 
(22) 
-=c 0. 
32  I  -  - .  -eww12  ....  + ql(l  +  + ~JU  + pi 
(19b)  eu”(wI,  + sll(l  + P)  + T22)  + v‘(w22  -  s>2  -  T22) 
A decrease  in savings in  period  1 by  the parent causes the child to transfer 
more to him in period 2. If 0 were zero, so that the child did not care about his 
parent, then the expression in equation (22) would be zero. The child’s love is 
necessary for the parent to overconsume in period  1. 
To  get a sense of  the effect  and to see that  it can result in undersaving, 
consider the log utility example above, but let all wages equal 1, except for the 
wage in period 3 which equals 10. The high last-period wages make optimal 
(in almost any sense) that transfers go from child to parent, because the child 
is relatively rich. Table 5.6 reports the results of solving system (17) as well as 
(19) and (21) for the case of  log utility  with 0 = 1/2 and wages equal to 1, 
except that the period-3 wage equals 10. 
The transfer to the parent is higher when the parent can lead the child. The 
parent, whose income is only 1 in each period, impoverishes himself by  bor- 
rowing 2.91 1 during the first period. He has only 1 in period 2 and without his 
child’s help would be bankrupt. But the child loves his parent to the tune of 
3.811, allowing the parent to repay the loan and still have more left than he 
would in the absence of a child. If  the child could choose the parent’s saving/ 
consumption  stream, he would  still end up transferring money to his parent, 
again, because of the high income that he receives in period 3. But the transfer 
would be considerably lower at 2.104, which would induce the parent to bor- 
row much less in period 1 (0.959 instead of 2.91  1). Thus, savings by the parent 
are lower when he can affect the transfer of the child. Further, the child saves 
less, as well,  in  the  parent-controlled  environment.  When the parent  “free 
rides,” he makes the child relatively  poor in period  2. As a result, the child 
borrows more than he would were he in direct control of parental savings deci- 
sions (6.032 instead of 5.200).’ 
While free riding may be a problem, there is nothing inherently intergenera- 
tional about it, nor is the phenomenon  one that bears only, or even primarily, 
on savings. In an economy where individuals care about one another, there is 
always an incentive to induce someone else to pay for one’s consumption. This 
7.  Some have extended consideration of intergenerational externalities to other individuals’ chil- 
dren. This is undersaving because each parent who cares about the child of another saves insuffi- 
ciently, in order to force the other parent to save for the next generation. All individuals would 
rather see the next generation richer, but they would prefer that others in this generation bear the 
cost. The equilibrium level of savings is too low as a result. 162  Edward P.  Lazear 
Table 5.6  Savings and Transfers with Free Riding by the Elderly 
Child’s choice  Parent’s Choice 
Variable  (eq. [171)  (eqs. [I91 and [21]) 
s,,  -0.959  -2.911 
SZ?  -5.200  -6.032 
T2  2  2.104  3.811 
would be true even if everyone lived only one period and at exactly the same 
time, where saving is precluded by definition. 
Further, while free riding might result in lower savings, it results in higher 
utility for the parent and lower utility for the child. Whether society disdains 
this outcome depends directly on the social welfare function. Again, saving is 
low relative to what the child would have arranged for his parent (and himself), 
not necessarily relative to what the parent likes. 
The cross-country comparisons are consistent with the view that parents are 
taking advantage of their children in the United States to a greater extent than 
in Japan. In order for the differences to go in the right direction, however, it 
would be necessary that American  children care more for their parents than 
Japanese children do for theirs. Then American parents would be more likely 
to play on their children’s love (see eq. [22]).  This could be done privately, 
through individual consumption, or through the government, by running large 
deficits and Social Security debt. 
While possible, the view that American children are more attached to their 
parents than their Japanese counterparts contradicts the view that the Japanese 
family is a closer-knit unit than the American family. Perhaps more likely is 
that  Japanese  parents  love their  children  more than  American  parents  love 
theirs and so are less likely to put themselves in the position of requiring sup- 
port in old age. 
5.2.4 
One argument that is often heard, usually in the context of trade deficits, is 
that our children are going to be forced to pay for our consumption today. The 
implication is again that we are doing a disservice to our children. There are 
two types of disservice that can be done. The first is that the capital stock in 
the future will be too low. The second is that, while the capital stock may be 
sufficiently high, the wrong people will own it. 
The first argument pertains most directly to growth in capital and endoge- 
nous technical change: if the economy were to save and invest more, future 
productivity and corresponding wages would be higher. While true, these argu- 
ments depend more on the total amount of saving and investment in the world 
than on the amount of savings by Americans. As long as capital (or labor) is 
mobile, and over the period of a generation there is reason to believe that there 
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is reasonable mobility of capital,8 the location of savings may be unimportant. 
If true, concern should be focused on the total amount of savings globally, not 
on the differences between American and Japanese savings rates. While total 
savings may be too low by the criteria of  the last section, international differ- 
ences in savings rates provide no evidence on this point. Japan’s high savings 
rate may mean that total savings are too high. America’s low savings rate may 
mean that world savings are too low. Or neither may be true. 
The second argument is that while aggregate worldwide savings may not be 
too low, the problem is that the Japanese rather than the Americans have claim 
to capital. There are two variants of  this argument. One is that the Japanese 
will use their capital only to help the Japanese. The other is that even if  the 
capital flows to the United States, the Japanese will receive the return on the 
capital, making Japanese children rich relative to American children. 
The first worry, that the Japanese will use their savings to help Japan, is an 
issue of  investment, not saving. If the Japanese save by buying U.S. corporate 
(or government) bonds and if  most of that investment is then used to create 
capital in the United States, then the Japanese will affect the productivity of 
future American workers, not of Japanese. Thus, worry about low American 
saving is misdirected, if the concern is the location of capital. Indeed, if capital 
is country specific, then encouraging foreign investment rather than high U.S. 
saving may be the correct strategy. 
Further, physical capital depreciates over time. It is quite possible to argue 
that the capital that is most important for economic growth and the prosperity 
of our children is human rather than physical. Investments in human capital, 
as measured by education and health investments, are high in the United States 
relative to Europe and comparable to levels in Japan (see Becker 1991). 
If  the  second worry  holds-namely  that  Japanese  children, rather  than 
American  children,  will  receive  the  return  to capital-no  collective  action 
need be taken. Even if all other Americans choose not to save, any given indi- 
vidual can bestow ownership of capital on his children by  his own personal 
saving. Whether he decides  to do so depends on utility considerations  dis- 
cussed above. But the capital ownership issue is more closely tied to transfer 
and bequest behavior than it is to national savings rates. 
The conclusion is altered when Americans care about the welfare of other 
children as well as that of  their own. Then collective action might be needed 
to avoid free-rider problems which arise when each individual wants others to 
save for the future generation. But if the care is for all children, not only Ameri- 
can ones, the issue becomes one of global saving rates, not American saving 
rates,  and there  is little  evidence  that  total  savings  are too low  relative  to 
some benchmark. 
8. See Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s  (1992)  work on convergence of income within the United States 
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5.2.5  Substitution of Government Savings for Private Savings 
It is possible that U.S. saving rates are not as low as they appear, say, because 
U.S. government savings displaces private savings and because the government 
accounts do not properly reflect government  saving^.^ If so, the question is not 
so much about savings, but about investment policy. Government saving, which 
yields government  investment, may be put to poorer use than private saving, 
which  finances primarily  private  investment. Little evidence  is available  on 
which to base any conclusions. Further, if this is the concern, the remedy is to 
revise government expenditure patterns, not to encourage more private saving. 
5.2.6  Taxes 
One reason to be concerned about the low U.S. savings rate is that the U.S. 
tax  system  may  create distortions  which  induce too little  saving. The most 
obvious candidate is the double taxation of income, which results because in- 
come is taxed when it is earned and interest on it is also taxed. Capital gains 
taxation,  if  not properly  indexed, can  also lead to  saving distortions.'" This 
essay is not the place to argue the validity or importance of tax-induced distor- 
tions. One point is clear, however. In  order for the tax  argument  to be  im- 
portant, there must be a significant (positive) interest elasticity of savings. Ob- 
viously, if  the  supply of  savings is relatively  inelastic, then  it  is difficult  to 
argue that there is substantial undersaving as a result of a distorted return. The 
evidence in this paper and elsewhere does not support a large saving elasticity. 
Although the question remains open, the current evidence does not persuade 
this author that the tax distortion  is an important  reason to worry about un- 
dersaving. 
5.2.7  Growth 
There is a general perception that links savings to growth. But the focus here 
really should be on investment, not saving. No theory argues that saving per se 
is important to growth.  Empirically, saving  and investment are likely to  be 
highly correlated, but there is no necessity that they are. The Japanese could 
use their savings to build factories in the United States, hiring American work- 
ers and taking their profits in American-made goods. Right now, many devel- 
oping countries, particularly those of Eastern Europe, look to other countries 
to inject capital into their struggling economies. While their attempts are likely 
to be frustrated, there is nothing at the theoretical  level to suggest that their 
strategies are misguided. 
Even if high levels of  domestic saving were necessary for growth, it is not 
automatic that more saving and more growth is better. Indeed, the p term that 
9. Hayashi (1986) has discussed differences in savings measurement between the United States 
and Japan. The discussion on whether government savings crowds out private savings is illustrated 
by the debate between Barro (1974) and Feldstein (1974). 
10. There is a large literature on the effects of  taxes  on savings. See, e.g., Kotlikoff (1984), 
King (1980),  Feldstein (1974). and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983). 165  Some Thoughts on Savings 
reflects the rate of return on capital can be interpreted as the growth parameter. 
Without growth externalities (which are not incorporated into the models), ev- 
erything said about the trade-offs between current and future consumption per- 
tains to growth as well. 
5.3  Measurement Issues 
A number of authors have attempted to reconcile the low U.S. savings rate 
and some of the differences between American and Japanese saving behavior 
by appealing to measurement differences (see, e.g., Hayashi 1986). Rather than 
reiterate those arguments, a few different points are briefly discussed in this 
section. 
The point that is emphasized here is not new, but its application to savings 
and earnings is.” When savings rates as low as 3-5  percent are observed in the 
United States, they may well be swamped by  implicit savings and investment 
that occurs on the job. 
To  see the point,  suppose that every individual  in the economy produced 
output stream A(r)f(k(t)), with f’  > 0, f”  < 0. Let the economy run for two 
periods (0 and 1) with initial capital stock being given as k,  and investment in 
period  0 denoted  Ak.  There is no depreciation,  and A(r) reflects  exogenous 
technical change. Capital stock in period  1 is therefore k,  + Ak so the invest- 
ment decision is 
Max A(O)f(k,) -  Ak  + GA(l)f(k,  + Ak).  (23) 
The first-order condition is 
Ak 
A(l)f’(k, + Ak) = 1/S, 
and there is a Ak* that solves equation (24). Since7 <  0, Ak is increasing in 6. 
How would a change in S affect measured saving? The answer depends on 
reporting. Lowering the discount rate, say, from infinity to zero (i.e., increasing 
6 from 0 to I), would increase Ak, while leaving unchangedfik,).  If firms were 
owned by  individuals other than their workers and workers were paid a piece 
rate instead of being  self-employed, each would  take homefik,)  and would 
save Ak* explicitly, say, by putting that amount in the bank. Firms would then 
borrow Ak* to undertake optimal investment as in equation (24). Thus, raising 
6 would raise measured saving and measured investment. 
But if workers were self-employed, the increase in saving and investment 
would be more likely to get lost. For example, suppose that investment takes 
the form of using workers’ time and perhaps some cannibalized parts from an 
existing machine to build an additional machine to be used in period  1. Mea- 
l l,  Jorgenson and Pachon (1983) recalculated  the capital stock with the inclusion of  human 
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sured output would beflk,) -  Ak, rather thanflk,), and measured saving and 
investment  would  be zero, even though  the  situation  is identical to the one 
where  firms are owned  by  outsiders  and all transactions  occur through  the 
market. 
Human capital  is the kind  of  saving and  investment that  is perhaps  most 
likely to be lost (see Jorgenson and Pachon 1983). Some human capital invest- 
ment is explicit and works through the market. Formal schooling and health 
care fit into this category. But on-the-job  training is most likely to go unre- 
corded in the firm’s books, even though workers who invest in on-the-job train- 
ing are undertaking both savings and investment. Measured output of the firm 
is reduced  because of time spent on training, and wages of the worker who 
receives the training are correspondingly  lower. The worker’s reported saving 
does not include the value of the on-the-job training. Indeed, reported saving 
may be lower since the worker substitutes higher-return on-the-job saving for 
lower market-observed saving. 
While the on-the-job training story may  be plausible, it probably does not 
help reconcile the disparity between American and Japanese saving rates. First, 
it has been observed that age-earning profiles are steeper in Japan than in the 
United States (see Hashimoto 1990; Mincer and Higuchi  1988). If  the slope 
reflects higher investment in on-the-job training in Japan, then observed sav- 
ings rates understate true saving by  more in Japan than in the United States. 
Second, today’s on-the-job training  is  tomorrow’s  output. If  the  on-the-job 
training story were important, labor productivity would be positively affected. 
Unless the increase in investment is a very recent phenomenon, early invest- 
ments in on-the-job  training  should  already be affecting productivity  today. 
But except for the last few years, productivity growth has been higher in Japan 
than in the United States, contradicting the hypothesis that unreported saving 
and investment is higher in the United States. 
Another type of  on-the-job saving may differ across countries. Consider a 
worker who lives two periods and produces $100 in each. There are no on-the- 
job training or work-life productivity effects. In one country, say, the United 
States, the worker is paid $100. During the first period, he consumes $90, puts 
$10 in the bank, and has an observed personal savings rate of  10 percent. In 
the last period, he consumes $100 plus $10(1 + p). 
In another country, say, Japan, the worker receives $90 during the first pe- 
riod. In the last period, the worker receives wages of $100 + $10(1 + p). The 
Japanese firm then uses the proceeds to invest in its own plant and equipment 
or to buy stocks and bonds of other corporations. 
This story fits the stylized facts. Japanese use financial institutions and their 
firms to do much of their investment. Firms hold portfolios of stocks and bonds 
in other firms. The steeper age-earnings profile seen in Japan is perfectly con- 
sistent with this story, even if  no on-the-job training occurs. There would be 
no need to observe higher labor productivity growth rates in the United States, 
because investment patterns could well be identical across countries. Unfortu- 167  Some Thoughts on Savings 
nately, since Japanese in-firm saving is more likely to get lost in official ac- 
counts than is U.S. market-transacted  saving, true Japanese  saving would be 
understated by a greater margin than true U.S. saving. Once again, differences 
in tastes must be invoked to explain international differences in consumption 
patterns. 
5.4  Conclusion 
There appear to be some differences in saving behavior, both over time and 
internationally, that can be explained by  resorting to demography.  But large 
disparities remained unexplained. The big question is, So what? While there 
may be reasons to be concerned about the low and declining American savings 
rates, the mere discrepancy between US. and Japanese savings rates does not 
speak to these concerns. In most cases, reasonable assumptions about differ- 
ences between the United States and Japan do not imply that American saving 
is too low. Similarly, the decline in the US. savings rate in the 1980s may be 
cause for concern, but not for the reasons generally presented  when arguing 
that the United States undersaves. 
Only a few of the many potential reasons for believing that the United States 
undersaves have been presented. In some sense, I have presented too many. It 
is quite clear that  under some not unreasonable  assumptions,  a case can be 
made that the United States undersaves. But the point made herein is that nei- 
ther the time-series nor cross-country data provide evidence on the issue. The 
fact that Japan’s savings rate is higher than that of the United States does not 
imply that we undersave  nor that they oversave. The fact that our rate is low 
today relative to 15 years ago does not imply that the savings rate then was 
closer to the social optimum than is the savings rate now. This essay, in at- 
tempting to shed some light on the issue, has a much more agnostic tone than 
the earlier literature. In large part, it reverts to the position that economists are 
not good at comparing one set of  tastes to another. 
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Comment  Jonathan Skinner 
Many economists and politicians have sounded the alarm about the low U.S. 
level of saving in the 1980s. If we cannot save more, the argument goes, invest- 
ment will fall, the Germans and Japanese will buy up the United States, and 
we will  enslave  our children  to economic dependency. Edward  Lazear’s re- 
sponse is, So what? This may appear to be a callous question to ask, but in fact 
it is a very good question-in  fact the first question-that  should be asked 
before  the government  tries to “cure”  the “problem”  with regulatory  or tax 
schemes. 
Lazear argues that the low saving rates are a consequence of different tastes 
for saving. If Americans prefer consuming  more today relative to the future, 
then that is their choice, and they should not be required, or even encouraged, 
to  save more. Lazear considers  alternative explanations  for why  the United 
States saves so little, but ultimately concludes that the difference in saving is a 
matter of taste. 
The U.S. national saving rate has been consistently below comparable sav- 
ing rates of  other countries  since the  1960s. In  1962, national  saving  (as a 
percentage  of GDP) in the United States was 9.1 percent.  In the same year, 
national saving was 21.7 percent  in Japan,  17.4 percent  in the Netherlands, 
17.3 percent in France,  and  18.6 percent  in Germany  (US. Congress, Joint 
Committee on Taxation 1991). 
It is likely that much of these differences can be attributed to tastes, as La- 
zear suggests. What has many  policymakers  womed, however, is the sharp 
decline in national saving, and in personal saving, during the 1980s. National 
saving in the United States fell from 8.9 percent in 1978 to 2.2 percent in 1986. 
A part of this decline was due to the increased deficit, but a substantial part 
was a consequence of reduced private saving as well.] To explain this decline 
as a reflection of “tastes,” one must identify changes in individual preferences 
toward saving. 
Alternatively, the declilie in saving could be the consequence of a market or 
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government failure that got worse during the 1980s. If such a failure were the 
cause, the policy implication would be much different. In that case, either fix- 
ing the distortion  or providing preferential  treatment of  saving to offset the 
inefficiency would be the appropriate course of action. 
Was the decline in saving a consequence of tastes or of market (or govern- 
ment) failure? To shed light on this question, I will randomly pick five from 
the many explanations for why  saving fell in the  1980s (also see Bosworth, 
Burtless, and Sabelhaus 1991).  Which of these explanations are market failures 
that should be rectified. and which are a consequence of individual tastes? 
1. Suppose that bequests are a function of the number of one’s children and 
that bequests comprise a large fraction of the national capital stock (e.g., Kotli- 
koff and Summers 1981). Then the smaller size of families could have shifted 
the demand for bequests to the left and thereby  reduced  saving. This is cer- 
tainly one explanation that relies solely on tastes; there is no rationale for gov- 
ernment intervention to push saving rates back up.? 
2. The saving rate in the national income accounts does not reflect capital 
gains, either in housing wealth or in the stock market. Rapid increases in stock 
market wealth during the mid- 1980s, by  stimulating consumption. could have 
pushed  down  conventionally  measured  saving  rates.  In  fact, an  alternative 
measure  of  the  saving  rate that  includes  such capital  gains  in housing  and 
wealth (and adds these gains to national income) implies saving rates of  over 
15 percentage  points during  1983-88,  that is, saving rates roughly  equal to 
those during 1974-79  (Skinner and Feenberg  1990; also see Hendershott and 
Peek 1989).  Of course, this explanation denies the existence of a saving prob- 
lem at all; instead, it attributes the entire fuss to confusion  over the proper 
measurement of “saving.” 
3. An increased fear of nuclear war may have caused the sharp decline in 
saving rates during the  1980s (Slemrod  1986). That is, why save if  one faces 
nuclear annihilation? Whether this is a change in tastes or a failure of the US. 
(or the  former Soviet) government to reduce  nuclear tension  is not entirely 
clear, but I will call this a draw. 
4.  An  alternative  explanation  is  the  higher  rates  of  return  accruing  to 
defined-benefit pension funds. Because pensions face fixed liabilities, a higher 
rate of  return on their investment allows firm-owned pension funds to reduce 
contributions or even revert pension assets to the firm (Bernheim and Shoven 
1987). Because pension funds are quintessential “target” savers, the higher in- 
terest rates during the  1980s could have reduced saving. Again, it is not clear 
whether the reduction in pension fund saving reflects individual tastes or op- 
portunistic pension fund managers. 
5. A  final explanation  suggests that  corporate buy-outs  and capital gains 
realizations led to the influx of cash into the hands of investors (Hatsopoulos, 
2. Whether this is a plausible explanation  is another question, since the decline in saving rates 
seemed too rapid to be explained by gradual shifts in fertility rates. 171  Some Thoughts on Savings 
Krugman, and Poterba  1989). With the cash hot in their pockets, the theory 
suggests, the lucky investors spent their wealth on cars and other consumption 
goods rather than reinvesting  it. If true, this view of  saving and consumption 
behavior would bode ill for any optimizing model of intertemporal consump- 
tion behavior. The presumption  that individuals are doing what is “best” for 
them presupposes  that cashing out stock should have little or no real effects 
on consumption. 
Of  the  five explanations  presented  above for the decline in saving in the 
1980s, only one is clearly a matter of changes in tastes. Other explanations are 
possible, but they are unlikely to be motivated entirely by changing tastes to- 
ward saving. To be on the safe side, one should therefore admit the possibility 
that the saving decline has been encouraged by  government regulatory or tax 
policies. If so, an active role for the government in encouraging saving behav- 
ior would be appropriate. 
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Comment on Chapters 4 and 5  B. Douglas Bernheim 
The fact that the United States saves so little, both by historical standards and 
in comparison to other countries (particularly Japan), has puzzled economists 
for many  years.  The literature is littered with possible explanations  for this 172  Comment on Chapters 4 and 5 
phenomenon,  none of  which are completely satisfying. Lazear is inclined to 
attribute international differences to “tastes,” and to some extent he also seems 
to endorse the view that differences in rates of saving over time probably reflect 
“cohort effects,” which he equates with tastes. Since economists are not usu- 
ally  inclined to  pass judgment on tastes, Lazear  concludes  that  the  welfare 
implications of low saving are ambiguous. 
Although I am inclined to agree with Lazear about the importance of tastes, 
I would emphasize a somewhat different point: tastes apparently change quite 
a lot. Rates of saving in Japan have varied enormously over the last 50 years. 
During  the interwar period, as  well  as  in  the  years  immediately  following 
World War 11,  the Japanese saved less than Americans. Similarly, Korea, Tai- 
wan, and Singapore saved very little as recently as 1960 and have only lately 
earned reputations as countries with high rates of saving. It certainly appears, 
if tastes are the chief determinants  of saving, that tastes can change dramati- 
cally within a very short period of time. Moreover, at least in the case of Japan, 
there is reason to believe that the government actively and successfully inter- 
vened in  a manner designed to shape tastes (see Central Council for Savings 
Promotion  198  1). These observations suggest that we, as economists, should 
focus on the following kinds of questions: Why do tastes for saving change? 
Can (and should) public policy affect the evolution of tastes? 
The need to think seriously about the evolution of tastes becomes particu- 
larly serious once one steps outside the narrow  confines of the life-cycle hy- 
pothesis. Dissatisfaction with the performance of this theory has led a growing 
number of  economists, myself  included, to ponder  “behavioral” alternatives 
(see, e.g., Shefrin and Thaler 1988). Some have argued for abandoning  the 
view that individuals act as if they maximize an intertemporal utility function 
and have instead emphasized the importance of  habit, mental accounting, self- 
discipline, and so forth. In many contexts, one can argue that, through trial and 
error, an individual eventually learns to behave in a way that is consistent with 
utility  maximization.  However, this  argument  is not applicable to life-cycle 
saving. Each individual accumulates resources for retirement only once; there 
is no opportunity to learn from one’s mistakes. Moreover, the life-cycle saving 
decision is extraordinarily complex, in that it requires an individual to contem- 
plate labor earnings, investment strategies, macroeconomic trends, and a vast 
assortment of risks, all over a very long time frame. It would be astonishing if 
the average individual, with no practice and little or no training, could on his 
first try act as if he was a perfectly rational, farsighted utility maximizer. 
By studying behavioral theories of household saving, it may be possible to 
understand differences in rates of saving both across countries and over time 
(for a more detailed discussion, see Bernheim 1991).  Japanese households may 
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have acquired frugal habits out of  necessity during the process of postwar re- 
construction, and these habits may have been cultivated and preserved through 
government intervention. Higher rates of saving among U.S. citizens who lived 
through the Great Depression may reflect the effects of experiencing depriva- 
tion first hand. Another factor contributing to the recent decline in U.S. saving 
could be the rise in the fraction of private income that is received in “spend- 
able” forms (see Hatsopoulos, Krugman, and Poterba 1989). It is also possible 
that the longest peacetime expansion on record contributed to a false sense of 
economic prosperity  and stability. Alternatively, Americans may simply have 
become accustomed  to rising consumption profiles, which, out of habit and 
myopia, they attempted to maintain ever after the productivity slowdown. 
Within the context of a behavioral theory, one can give content to statements 
about welfare, such as “Americans do not save enough.” Individuals may well 
regret their bad habits and lack of foresight after the fact. Moreover, the behav- 
ioral framework suggests some well-defined roles for public policy. First, and 
perhaps foremost, the government may be in a position to provide information 
and  training,  thereby  helping  individuals  to  further  their  own  objectives 
through the design of more coherent and effective long-range financial plans. 
During much of the postwar period, the Japanese  government assumed pre- 
cisely this role. Second, it may also be desirable to encourage the acquisition of 
beneficial habits by subsidizing saving. In much the same way, the government 
discourages the consumption of cigarettes through education and taxation. 
Even  if  one insists  on adhering  to the life-cycle  framework,  I  would  not 
agree that the welfare effect of low saving is ambiguous. On the contrary, there 
are at least seven good neoclassical reasons to believe that saving is too low. 
1. Capital income is taxed, both explicitly and implicitly (e.g., through col- 
lege scholarships).  Lazear dismisses  this argument, on the  grounds that the 
interest elasticity of saving is very low. Although this strikes me as a fair char- 
acterization of  the evidence, it is at odds with more direct evidence  on the 
effect of taxes (e.g.,  Venti and Wise 1990).  To infer tax effects from estimates 
of the interest elasticity, one must subscribe to an important unstated assump- 
tion: the effect of a change in the after-tax rate of return induced by a move- 
ment of the before-tax rate of return is the same as the effect of  a change in 
the after-tax rate of return attributable to a movement of the effective tax rate. 
In the context of  investment, other authors (e.g., Hall and Jorgenson  1967) 
have been roundly  criticized for making precisely  this assumption.  One can 
easily imagine a number of reasons for questioning its validity. For example, 
if the stochastic processes governing gross interest rates and taxes differ, one 
would  hardly expect investors to respond  similarly to changes in these vari- 
ables. Another possibility is suggested by my work with John Shoven. Several 
years ago (Bernheim and Shoven 1987),  we pointed out that the interest elastic- 
ity of contributions to pension funds is large and negative. This may dampen 
the response of aggregate saving to a change in the gross rate of interest. How- 174  Comment on Chapters 4 and 5 
ever, it does not dampen the response  of  saving to a change in the tax rate. 
Hence, a low estimate of  the interest elasticity of saving is consistent with a 
high tax elasticity. 
2.  The nature of intergenerational equilibria can create a bias against saving. 
Lazear adopts the formulation of intergenerational preferences popularized by 
Becker (1974) and Barro (1974). In particular, the preferences of generation t 
are summarized by a utility index U,,  where 
In this equation, c, represents  generations  t’s consumption, and  U,,  , denotes 
the utility index for generation t’s successor generation. Implicitly, each gener- 
ation has only one successor and one predecessor. When this formulation  of 
preferences is used, authors typically focus attention on a class of equilibria 
that correspond to the solution of a standard dynamic programming problem, 
where the objective function  is the present discounted  value (discounting  at 
the rate P) of the stream v(c,).  This approach to intergenerational equilibria is 
extremely special. There are many plausible ways to deviate from it. 
First, one could adopt an alternative formulation of preferences.  Suppose, 
for example, that parents care about the felicity (v(c,+,))  of their children, rather 
than utility (U,,,). Mathematically, 
This formulation  has a  straightforward  economic interpretation:  parents  re- 
ceive pleasure from their children’s consumption, but regard bequests to later 
generations as wasteful. While somewhat extreme, it captures a plausible situa- 
tion: generation t + 1 cares more about the consumption of generations after t 
+ 1 (relative to the consumption of generation t + 1) than does generation t. 
A number of authors have studied intergenerational equilibria with preferences 
of this form. The problem is complex, since the preference of successive gener- 
ations are not dynamically consistent, and game-theoretic  tools must be em- 
ployed. However, it is known that Markov-perfect equilibria are never Pareto 
optimal. Moreover, one Pareto improves the equilibrium allocation by increas- 
ing saving (see Bernheim and Ray 1987). 
Second, one could relax the counterfactual assumption that each generation 
has only a single successor and predecessor. It is well-known that this assump- 
tion  is pernicious  (see Bernheim  and Bagwell  1988). Its importance in the 
current context stems from the fact that children  marry other children  from 
different families, so that each married household has two distinct predeces- 
sors. From the point of view of these two parent households, the consumption 
of  the common  child household  is a public  good. As a result,  it is usually 
possible to improve on equilibrium allocations by increasing the intergenera- 
tional transfer of resources. This entails greater saving. 
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of equilibria, and there is no particular reason to believe that the economy will 
settle on an efficient one (see Gale 1985). 
3. The government operates a large number of  social insurance programs, 
including Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, unemployment insurance, and 
so forth. These programs reduce precautionary motives for saving. Indeed, the 
fact that, until  recently, Japan’s social insurance  system was underdeveloped 
has often  been  offered  as a partial  explanation  for differences  between  the 
saving rates of  Japan and the United States. Indeed, as Japan has improved its 
social insurance system, its rate of saving has fallen. 
When insurance is provided  by  an efficient market, any depressive effects 
on saving are first-best. However, social insurance programs generally arise in 
response to market failures. There is no particular reason to believe that current 
social insurance programs lead to a second-best level of saving.’ 
4. Lazear describes an intertemporal  incentive problem commonly known 
as the “Samaritan’s dilemma” (see, e.g., Buchanan  1975; Bernheim and Stark 
1988). The general statement of this problem is as follows. There are two par- 
ties, A and B. A cares about B, but B does not care about A. These parties 
interact over time; for simplicity, we assume that there are two periods. B will 
tend to save less in the first period than he would if A were selfish, because he 
knows that, in the second period, an altruistic A will bail him out. 
Lazear describes a particular version of this problem, in which A is a child 
and B is a parent. The story is also often told the other way around (with A as 
the parent and B as the child), in order to explain why the children of  wealthy 
parents save so little. A similar problem can arise between  spouses, or even 
between unrelated individuals. Lazear is therefore correct in asserting that this 
is not inherently an intergenerational issue. However, this should not obscure 
the fact that it is an intertemporal issue and that it inherently involves saving. 
Moreover,  when Lazear  asserts that B is better off  with low saving, this is 
misleading-in  the presence of the Samaritan’s dilemma, one can always Par- 
eto improve the equilibrium allocation, and this improvement is achieved (in 
part) by increasing saving. 
5. In a closed economy, saving necessarily equals investment. Consequently, 
if there are important external economies associated with investment, the levels 
of  both  saving and investment will tend to be low relative to the optimum. 
Externalities of  this sort have featured prominently in the recent literature on 
endogenous growth. 
Of  course, the US.  economy is not closed. Nevertheless, there appears to 
be some long-run tendency toward balanced current and capital accounts. As 
a result, the level of saving probably does have a significant impact on invest- 
ment; with external economies, households will save too little. 
1. It is worth mentioning, however, that second-best social insurance might entail provisions to 
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6. Lazear mentions the possibility that there may be positive  externalities 
associated with investments in children, but does not present this theory in its 
most favorable light. I believe that there are important externalities of  this sort, 
but they are local, rather than national, in scope. For a variety of reasons, it is 
more enjoyable to live in communities where other people’s children are well- 
educated and well provided for. This is not the result of nationalistic sentiment 
(Lazear’s characterization), but rather a consequence of pragmatism. 
7. It is also arguable that saving is too low from the standpoint of equity. To 
illustrate, consider once again the Becker-Barro “dynastic” equilibrium dis- 
cussed under point 2 above. This equilibrium maximizes the utility of the first 
generation. It corresponds to the Pareto optimum found by assigning a weight 
of unity to the utility of the first generation and a weight of zero to all subse- 
quent  generations. If  the planner  attaches any positive  weight to any  subse- 
quent  generation, equilibrium  saving will be suboptimal. Lazear touches  on 
this point; for a more detailed discussion, see Bemheim (1989). 
Lazear tends to discount this argument,  on the grounds that children may 
also care about their parents. If altruism toward parents is sufficiently strong, 
then the preferences of  subsequent generations will coincide with those of the 
first generation, and the equilibrium allocation will be equally beneficial  for 
everyone. Aside from being a knife-edge case, this suggestion is also empiri- 
cally implausible. Because of economic growth, children tend to be lifetime 
wealthier than parents. Despite this, transfers mostly flow from parents to chil- 
dren, and not from children to parents. This strongly suggests that parents are 
generally more altruistic toward children than children are toward parents. 
In summary, Lazear and I agree that we cannot yet adequately explain the 
decline of  saving in the United  States, or the differences  in rates  of  saving 
between the United States and other countries. However, I do not agree that 
the welfare consequences of low saving are ambiguous. There are good theo- 
retical and empirical reasons to believe that Americans save too little. Lazear’s 
skepticism  should not  discourage  us  from vigorously  pursuing  policies  de- 
signed to stimulate the rate of saving. 
One such policy permits households to receive tax-favored treatment on re- 
sources contributed  to 401(k) plans. The paper by Poterba, Venti, and Wise 
(chap. 4) provides some useful background information on 401(k)s, as well as 
a preliminary analysis of the effect of these plans on household saving. This 
analysis suggests that contributions  to 401(k)s  represent new  saving. If  this 
conclusion is correct, then 401  (k)s provide an extremely powerful policy tool. 
Unfortunately,  it is very difficult to measure the impact of tax-favored  ac- 
counts on household saving. Poterba, Venti, and Wise have adopted an empiri- 
cal strategy similar in spirit to that used by Venti and Wise in a series of earlier 
papers on Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). Although this methodology 
goes some distance toward producing believable results, it falls short of provid- 
ing a completely convincing solution to problems arising from population het- 
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The Poterba-Venti-Wise methodology represents an attempt to statistically 
mimic a controlled experiment in which households are randomly assigned to 
two groups, one of which is eligible for 401(k)s and one of  which is not. A 
comparison of average saving across these groups would presumably provide 
us with an estimate of the effect of 401(k) eligibility on saving. 
The simplest approach would be to ignore the endogeneity of the decision 
to contribute to a 401(k) and to compare average saving across contributors 
and noncontributors. Unfortunately, we are not likely to learn very much from 
this calculation. Some households save a lot, while some save a little. This is 
presumably attributable to differences in preferences. One should not be sur- 
prised to discover that those who contribute to 401(k) accounts also save more 
in other forms; through self-selection, this group probably consists of house- 
holds with strong preferences for saving. 
In their work  on IRAs, Venti and Wise refine this  simple comparison  by 
controlling for initial wealth. This variable is intended to capture the effects of 
heterogeneity along the dimension of  preferences toward saving-households 
with strong preferences  for saving will also have higher initial wealth. Even 
so, one should  not  be  too surprised  to  discover that,  controlling  for initial 
wealth, IRA (or 401(k)) contributors saved more in other forms. It would be 
extreme to suggest that the disposition to save remains constant over an indi- 
vidual’s life. Many people may pass through periods when they save a lot, as 
well as periods when they save a little. This could arise quite naturally from a 
variety of considerations. For example, some people may start saving for retire- 
ment only after achieving some specific age or stage of life (e.g., completion 
of child rearing). Alternatively, individuals may experience shocks to income 
that persist for several years before dissipating. When passing through a period 
of temporarily high income, such an individual will tend to save more. 
It seems to me that these forms of population  heterogeneity  are not only 
plausible, but that they could well account for a positive correlation between 
contributions to tax-favored accounts and other forms of saving, even control- 
ling for initial wealth. To emphasize this point, I will  suggest a hypothetical 
calculation (which one could, in principle, perform): compute the correlation 
between wealth accumulation  in the form of stocks and wealth accumulation 
in the form of bonds, controlling for initial wealth. My guess is that one would 
find a significant positive correlation. This would not prove that the availability 
of stocks causes people to save in the form of bonds. Rather, it would simply 
show that those who decide to save during any given period allocate their re- 
sources across a variety of asset classes. 
The current paper improves on previous efforts to measure the effect of tax- 
favored accounts on saving by performing two additional calculations. First, it 
compares the assets of a group of households in 1984 with the assets of another 
group of households  in  1987. These groups are selected to be as similar as 
possible. According to Poterba, Venti, and Wise, the important difference be- 
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eligibility than the 1984 sample. As it turns out, the 1987 sample had accumu- 
lated more assets. 
I am not convinced that this procedure  eliminates  the problem  of  sample 
selection. The 1984 and 1987 samples only include 401(k) contributors. Thus, 
the sample selection criteria are different: in 1984, the authors study a group 
of households that still contributed to 401(k)s after (typically) not more than 
three years of eligibility; in 1987, they study a group that still contributed to 
401(k)s after (typically) not more than six years of eligibility. What happens 
when  one conditions  sample  selection  on the continuation  of  contributions 
after N years of eligibility? Presumably, as N rises, one isolates the “die hard” 
households that are completely dedicated to saving. (Analogously, lapse rates 
for life insurance are highest during the first few years of  a policy.) Conse- 
quently, one should not be surprised if total assets rise when the selection crite- 
ria is based on a larger value of N. 
Poterba, Venti, and Wise also implement a second methodological innova- 
tion: they compare the assets of households that are eligible to make 401(k) 
contributions with the assets of  ineligible households (controlling for income 
class). Since eligibility is determined  by  employers, the authors believe  that 
cross-sectional variation in eligibility status provides an exogenous natural ex- 
periment. In effect, 401(k) eligibility is used as an instrument. 
Unfortunately,  there is probably  a systematic relationship  between 401  (k) 
eligibility and other factors that influence saving. In many companies, benefits 
are influenced by  the opinions  of  workers and, in some cases, are based on 
surveys of worker preferences. To  some extent, workers self-select over jobs; 
those who care more about saving for retirement may be more likely to accept 
positions with firms that offer 401(k)s. Finally, eligibility for a 401(k) is corre- 
lated  with  other job characteristics  (better jobs are more  likely  to  provide 
40  1  (k) options). 
The paper itself convincingly documents the endogeneity of  40  1  (k)s. Refer 
in particular in table 4.13. For the moment, focus on the  summary statistics 
provided for households with incomes between $50,000 and $75,000 in 1987. 
The median  assets of  households  eligible for 401(k)s exceeded  the median 
assets of ineligible households by  $9,693 ($25,343 -  $14,650). And yet  me- 
dian 401(k) balances for the eligible group were only $1,500. I doubt very 
much whether the authors would claim that 401(k)s crowd in other saving by 
a factor of six. Rather, something else is creating a correlation between assets 
and 401(k) eligibility.  A  similar conclusion  follows for every  other income 
class. 
Overall, I found the authors’ analysis interesting, and I am sympathetic to 
their conclusions. Their work  continues to move my posterior beliefs in the 
direction  suggested  by  their conclusions.  However, the jury is still out, and 
further work is clearly warranted. 179  Comment on Chapters 4 and 5 
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